

Message Text

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DRAFTED BY: S/S-O:AWOTTO

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TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 214447 TOSEC 240011

NODIS

CHEROKEE WHITE HOUSE PLEASE PASS TO SECRETARY AT CAMP DAVID

FOLLOWING REPEAT DAR ES SALAAM 3138 ACTION SECSTATE DTD 28 AUG

QTE

S E C R E T DAR ES SALAAM 3138

NODIS/CHEROKEE

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM SCHAUFLE

E.O.11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR

SUBJECT: SECOND MEETING WITH NYERERE

REF: DAR ES SALAAM 3136

1. I WAS CALLED BACK FOR SECOND MEETING WITH NYERERE WHO OBVIOUSLY
HAD BEEN REFLECTING FURTHER ON EARLIER CONVERSATION.

2. HE OPENED BY SAYING THAT HE WANTED TO REFORMULATE THE DISTINCTION
BETWEEN NAMIBIA AND RHODESIA. NAMIBIA CAN BE DONE NOW AND MAJOR
US PRESSURE SHOULD BE EMPLOYED ON THIS ISSUE. HOWEVER, FOR

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RHODESIA HE NEEDS TIME BECAUSE OF THE DIVISIONS AMONG THE NATION-

ALISTS. HE DID NOT MEAN THAT WE SHOULD CEASE OR RELAX OUR EFFORTS BUT THAT WE SHOULD BE PREPARED TO HANDLE TWO QUESTIONS DIFFERENTLY IF NECESSARY.

3. NYERERE SAID HE WAS AWARE THAT YOU INTEND TO SPEAK ON AFRICA AUGUST 31 AND WONDERED IF YOU COULD DRAW A DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE TWO ISSUES SO THAT IT WOULD NOT NECESSARILY BE EXPECTED THAT EQUAL PROGRESS WOULD BE MADE ON BOTH. IF THIS WERE POSSIBLE, HE WOULD FEEL MORE COMFORTABLE IN GOING ON. HE ADDED THAT EVEN SUCCESS ON NAMIBIA ALONE WOULD SATISFY AFRICAN RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES.

4. I TOLD HIM THAT TWO THOUGHTS IMMEDIATELY OCCURRED TO ME. THE NATIONALIST LEADERS OVER THE YEARS HAVE INDULGED IN LUXURY OF DISAGREEING WITH EACH OTHER, PERHAPS BECAUSE THEY DID NOT EXPECT ANYTHING TO HAPPEN SOON. NOW THAT THEY WERE PRESENTED WITH THE REAL PROSPECT OF PROGRESS WOULD NOT THIS BE A POWERFUL INDUCEMENT TO UNITE, EVEN TEMPORARILY. NYERERE AGREED THAT IT SHOULD.

5. SECONDLY, I SAID THAT OUR ANALYSIS WAS THAT THERE WAS A POSSIBILITY OF A POSITIVE SOUTH AFRICAN MOVE UNDER GREAT U.S. PRESSURE WHICH ALL OBSERVERS AGREE IS NECESSARY. SHOULD WE LOSE THIS OPPORTUNITY AND THE VIOLENCE ESCALATE THE PROSPECT FOR SAG COOPERATION LATER WOULD INEVITABLY DIMINISH AND SIMULTANEOUSLY THE CAPACITY OF US TO MAKE ITS CONTRIBUTION WOULD BE SERIOUSLY LIMITED.

6. NYERERE SAID HE REALIZED THIS BUT FEARED THAT UNIFICATION OF NATIONALIST LEADERS WOULD BE DIFFICULT IN SHORT TIME FRAME. HE NOTED THAT AFRICANS HAD WORKED WITH SOUTH AFRICANS BEFORE AND, ALTHOUGH HE BELIEVED VORSTER REALLY WANTED A RHODESIAN SETTLEMENT, HE COULD NOT MAKE AN ALLY OF SOUTH AFRICA. IF THE KILLING OF WHITES LED VORSTER TO ALLY HIMSELF WITH SMITH THEN THAT IS SOUTH AFRICA'S DECISION.

7. I NOTED THAT WE BELIEVED WE COULD SUCCEED IN SEPARATING RHODESIAN AND NAMIBIAN PROBLEMS FROM THAT OF SOUTH AFRICA WHICH WAS INFINITELY MORE DIFFICULT ISSUE. IN MY OPINION, IF SAG WERE TO ALLY ITSELF WITH SMITH THEN THE RHODESIAN PROBLEM BECAME INEXTRICABLY LINKED TO THE INTERNAL SOUTH AFRICAN QUESTION,

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FURTHER POSTPONING ANY POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT IN RHODESIA.

8. NYERERE ADMITTED THAT EVEN THOUGH AFRICANS TEND TO SEE SOUTHERN AFRICA AS A SINGLE ISSUE THE BEST STRATEGY IS TO GO AT IT PEICEMEAL. HE THOUGHT NO ONE IN AFRICA HAD GIVEN ANY SERIOUS THOUGHT TO HOW TO HANDLE THE PROBLEM IN SOUTH AFRICA ITSELF EVEN THOUGH ITS OWN INTERNAL DIFFICULTIES HAD NOW BEGUN.

9. I SAID THAT I WOULD INFORM YOU IMMEDIATELY OF HIS FURTHER THINKING. COULD I ALSO ASSURE YOU THAT HE WOULD DO HIS BEST IN THE MEETING HE IS PLANNING WITH THE NATIONALIST LEADERS (PROBABLY NEXT WEEK IN DAR ES SALAAM)? HE REPLIED AFFIRMATIVELY ADDING, AS HE CUPPED HIS HAND, THAT THEY HAVE THE ANSWER "RIGHT THERE" IN THEIR GRASP IF THEY CAN SETTLE THEIR DIFFERENCES. HE CONCLUDED BY STATING THAT HE AGREES WITH YOUR STRATEGY AND HIS JOB IS TO CONVINCE THEM ON THE BASIS OF OUR COUNSULTATIONS.

10. COMMENT: ON BALANCE NYERERE MAY BE KEEPING HIS OPTIONS OPEN EVEN THOUGH MOMENTUM SEEMS TO HAVE PASSED BACK TO HIM FROM MACHEL IN WAKE OF FAILURE TO ORGANIZE "THIRD FORCE" AS POLITICAL FORCE. HOWEVER, I BELIEVE HE STILL SUPPORTS OUR INITIATIVE AND ANY DOUBTS ARE BASED ON WHETHER HE AND OTHER PRESIDENTS CAN DELIVER. HE MAY SINCERELY DOUBT CAPABILITY OF FOUR PRESIDENTS TO FORCE UNITY, IN PART BECAUSE THEY ARE PROBABLY UNWILLING TO USE ULTIMATE PRESSURE WHICH CONTROL OF DISTRIBUTION OF ARMS AND MATERIAL TO LIBERATION FORCES PROVIDES THEM. TO CUT OFF SUPPLIES TO OR SEVERELY RESTRICT MOVEMENTS OF LIBERATION FORCES WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY SUBJECT THEM TO SERIOUS ADVERSE AFRICAN REACTION.

11. I HAVE NOT SEEN MOST RECENT DRAFT OF AUG. 31 SPEECH. HOWEVER, IT OCCURS TO ME THAT REFERENCE COULD BE MADE TO RELATIVELY LESS COMPLICATED NATURE OF NAMIBIAN QUESTION WITHOUT GIVING SLIGHTEST REASON TO BELIEVE THAT WE ARE DETACHING IT FROM RHODESIAN PROBLEM WHICH SHOULD SATISFY NYERERE. I BELIEVE WE SHOULD PURSUE OUR COURSE BECAUSE EVEN IF IT FAILS IT WILL NOT BE FOR LACK OF US EFFORT BUT BECAUSE RHODESAIN NATIONALISTS THEMSELVES WERE NOT PREPARED TO ASSUME POWER WHEN IT WAS POSSIBLE. TO CHANGE DIRECTION NOW WOULD GIVE IMPRESSION WE WERE UNABLE TO GAIN AFRICAN OR SOUTH AFRICAN COOPERATION WHICH AT THIS POINT IS NOT THE CASE.

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12. IF YOU DECIDE TO SEND MESSAGE TO NYERERE (DAR 3137) YOU MAY WANT TO TAKE THIS CONVERSATION INTO CONSIDERATION.
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